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I. INTRODUCTION
This article looks at the status of macro trends in venture capital
investing in light of the Great Recession and then examines whether those
trends have had an impact on the transaction terms presented to
entrepreneurs by venture capital investors.
II. PRELIMINARY QUESTION:
WHY LOOK AT VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT?
The 2011 Symposium was entitled "The Big Squeeze: Small Business
Financing During the Great Recession" and the symposium program
featured a quote from Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke that read, in
part: "Small businesses are central to creating jobs in our economy."'
Evidence suggests, however, that in the context of entrepreneurial activity
(that is, the formation and operation of new business enterprises) most
small businesses are not meaningful job creators.
Scott A. Shane, A. Malachi Mixon III Professor of Entrepreneurial
Studies at Case Western Reserve University, examined entrepreneurship
data in order to test the validity of common knowledge on the subject and
assembled a fascinating array of information.2 Professor Shane notes that
while approximately two million new businesses are started in the United
States each year, approximately seventy-five percent of those
* Patrick J. McDonough Director of the Business, Loyola Law School. It was a
privilege to participate in the 2011 Symposium and I thank the board and staff of
the Journal for the invitation and their hospitality during my stay in Columbus. I
also want to thank my colleague Therese Maynard for her thoughts and insights on
my presentation, and my wife, Linnea Warren, for her work on the graphs and
charts as well as for her endless support and help.
1 Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Res., Addressing the Financing Needs of Small
Businesses, Speech at the Federal Reserve Meeting Series (July 12, 2010),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bemanke20100712a.htm.
2 See SCOTT A. SHANE, THE ILLUSIONS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE COSTLY
MYTHS THAT ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND POLICY MAKERS LIVE BY 3
(2008).
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entrepreneurial efforts are self-employed people with no other employees.
Of the approximately twenty-five percent of new businesses that the Small
Business Administration refers to as "employer firms" started from 1989
through 2003 (which includes the spectacular period of growth reflected in
the tech bubble of the '90s), only ten percent (approximately 50,000
businesses) had five or more employees.4 This is not simply the result of the
high failure rate of new businesses. The fact is that fewer than one in five
entrepreneurs even begin a business with a desire to grow it beyond one
employee.5 In short, an overwhelming percentage of new businesses, and
hence small businesses, do very little job creation.
Venture capital is relevant to job creation because early stage venture
investment is focused exclusively on that tiny portion of small and new
businesses that are formed with the intention of rapid growth. A fast-
growing company quickly becomes an "employer firm" at the far end of the
scale as it creates jobs to support its presumed large business opportunity.
In 2008, companies that had received venture capital financing employed
12.1 million people, representing eleven percent of the private sector
workforce. 6 With the self-employed representing about 1.5 million of the
approximately two million new businesses formed each year, and with
venture capital investing in only 27,000+ companies cumulatively from
1970 to 2008, 7 it should be apparent that the source of job creation is
heavily skewed towards a very slender slice of new and small businesses.
In light of the manifest differences in the job creation nature of new
businesses, public policy that is focused on small business or
entrepreneurship generally as an engine for job growth is woefully
misdirected. Instead, it is appropriate as a policy matter to direct attention to
that minute portion of entrepreneurs who are building businesses that match
the profile that venture capital investors seek because that is where the jobs
are formed.
More specifically, at the Symposium we heard from a number of
speakers that maintaining the current marginal ordinary income tax rates for
3 Id. at 11, 162.
4 Id. at 65.
5 Id. at 66.
6 NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE
OF VENTURE CAPITAL-BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY (5th ed. 2009),
available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=comdocman&task=doc_
download&gid=482&Itemid=93.
7 See id; SHANE, supra note 2, at 162; PricewaterhouseCoopers & Nat'l Venture
Capital Ass'n, MoneyTree Report, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 24,
2011). MoneyTree Report is a product of collaboration between
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National Venture Capital Association based upon
data from Thomson Reuters.
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the highest tax brackets is an important priority for small business people.
Consistent with the earlier quote from Chairman Bemanke, 8 this position
was supported with the argument that lower tax rates are key to allowing
small business, to continue to create jobs. Regardless of the merits of low
tax rates, the data does not support job creation as a justification for this
policy position.
Setting aside all the self-employment new businesses, consider an
'"employer firm" such as a new dry cleaning business. Assuming the owner
of the dry cleaning shop is doing well enough to be taxed at the highest
marginal rate, does lowering her tax rate cause her to hire another counter
attendant? No, it simply puts more money in her pocket. It might well give
her the resources to invest in a more sophisticated automation system that
will pay for itself by eliminating a current employee, but a lower maximum
marginal tax rate will not cause the owner to employ more people than the
level of business operations requires. Further, it will not increase the level
of the business's operations.
New employees are hired because the demand for the business's goods
or services requires more personnel to create or provide those goods or
services. It is axiomatic that venture capital investment is largely based on
an anticipation of a big market for the goods or services a company is
formed to provide. You have a big market when there are a lot of people
spending large sums of money on weak or inadequate solutions to a
problem that you solve effectively for the same or fewer dollars. When
venture capitalists talk about large markets what they mean is that there will
be huge demand for the product or service once it becomes available.
Venture capital financed companies create jobs in anticipation of, and to
serve, that demand. Tax policy that does not foster demand does not create
jobs. Lowering (or maintaining low) maximum marginal tax rates does not
foster demand because the portion of the population affected is too small
for the extra disposable income to have an impact on the economy.
Alternatively, another tax policy change that is getting attention is the
taxation applicable to venture capitalists' "carry." Without getting into too
much detail, venture capital professionals typically operate as the general
partner of a limited partnership investment fund. They are compensated
through a management fee (ordinary income) and an allocation of the
investment gains (usually capital gains) from the fund they manage, the
latter based on the percentage of capital they invested in the fund. But, once
all the invested capital has been returned to the limited partner investors
(that is, the fund becomes profitable on an overall basis), the return
allocation for the venture capitalists goes up to twenty percent of all returns,
regardless of the portion of the capital they contributed to the fund. This
step-up for good investment results is often called the "carry." Since most
8 See Bemanke, supra note 1.
4 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7.1
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
venture capital fund gains come from capital appreciation in the stock of the
fund's portfolio, companies and limited partnerships are pass-through tax
entities. Venture capitalists typically pay capital gain rates on the extra
value received because of the carry, despite the fact that it is a
compensation bonus for having invested the fund's money well, and higher
ordinary income tax rates typically apply to compensation.
Similar carry structures are used by private equity funds (which usually
specialize in acquisitions of businesses-payment goes to an existing owner
and layoffs often follow-rather than investments-payment goes into the
company to allow it to grow) and to hedge funds, which do all sorts of
financial manipulations, often with large amounts of borrowed money.
While the carry in venture capital funds has received some attention from
tax analysts,9 it probably is the huge profits paid out to some hedge fund
managers that gave this issue political traction. Venture capitalists may find
themselves grouped with the private equity and hedge fund managers in
some broadly applied tax reform to correct this perceived under-taxation.
Regardless of the merits of this change in tax policy, it makes venture
capital funds (the only one of the three fund types that.actually invests in
job-creating businesses) more expensive to operate and therefore less
attractive as an investment opportunity for the pension funds and other
institutional investors that provide the money to the venture capitalists. The
end result could be less money would be invested in venture capital funds,
which means less money would be available for that small segment of new
companies that create jobs, which means fewer jobs would be created.
Thus, in the face of the Great Recession and the need for jobs to give
people income so they can demand goods and services, and thereby create
more jobs, venture capital plays a key role that needs to be understood so
that the consequences of tax and other public policy decisions are better
appreciated. Without advocating a position on either of the tax issues
offered as examples, an examination of the realities of entrepreneurship and
small business, and the role of venture capital investment, should lead to a
better understanding of the consequences of these sorts of policy choices.
III. MACRO TRENDS IN.VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT.
Utilizing the MoneyTree Reports from PricewaterhouseCoopers and the
National Venture Capital Association based on data from Thompson
Reuters, our first objective is to look at the impact of the Great Recession
on venture capital investment generally.10 The following charts address and
9 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in
Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2008).10 See PricewaterhouseCoopers & Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, MoneyTree Report:
Q4 2010/Full-Year 2010, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (2011), https://www.pwc
moneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/moneytree/filesource/exhibits/MoneyTreeQ42010_
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allow us to discuss the implications of several important metrics in
monitoring venture capital so that we can better understand the current state
of the industry.
Figure 1
Fig. 1, Annual Venture Capital Investments, lays out the amount of
money venture capital funds invest in portfolio companies each year. The
Full%20Year.pdf. See also PricewaterhouseCoopers & Nat'l Venture Capital
Ass'n, MoneyTree Report: Q2 2011 Results, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (2011),
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/moneytree/filesource/exhibits/Mone
yTree%20Q2%20201 _Final.pdf. Other sources are available, such as Dow Jones
VentureSource, which shows similar trends but different specific results.
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chart allows us to see the run up to the tech bubble in the late 90s, which
peaks at $98.6 billion of investment in 2000 and falls to an annual
investment low of $18.8 billion in 2003. We then see the recovery through
2007, when $29.9 billion was invested, the fall off as a result of the Great
Recession beginning in 2008, and in 2009 a new post-bubble low
investment amount of $18.3 billion. For 2010 we see recovery to $21.8
billion of investment. In the first half of 2011, $13.8 billion was invested, a
twelve percent increase from first half of 201011 and an indication of
continuing recovery..
Figure 2
Investments by region:
Full year 2010
Total Investments - $2,823.4 million in 3,277 deals
a $ Millions
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1 Id. The PricewaterhouseCoopers MoneyTree Report is comprehensively updated
with each quarterly issuance as new historical data becomes available. Year-end
data is taken from the Q4/Full Year 2010 Update and partial-year data is taken
from the Q2 2011 Update, but those numbers may be adjusted in subsequent
updates.
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Fig. 2, Investments by Region, shows that the top five regions for
venture capital investment, as a percentage of total funds invested in 2010,
are Silicon Valley (thirty-nine percent), New England (twelve percent),
Southern California (eleven percent), the New York Metropolitan area (nine
percent), and the Midwest (five percent). Data for the first half of 2011
shows a similar allocation, although Southern California investment
appears to have fallen off by about a percentage point and the Midwest has
fallen by a half point.'
2
Whether those changes indicate real slowing or just uneven deal flow
will take a few more quarters to ascertain.
Figure 3
Investments by industry:
Full year 2010
Total Investments - $21,823.4 million in 3,277 deals
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Fig. 3, Investments by Industry, shows that the primary industries for
venture capital investment in 2010 were Software (eighteen percent),
12id.
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Biotechnology (seventeen percent), Industrial/Energy (primarily "Clean
Tech") (fifteen percent), Medical Devices/Equipment (eleven percent), and
Information Technology Services (eight percent). The primary change
appearing in the first half of 2011 is that Clean Tech investment has
dropped under ten percent, with its loss in allocation shifting fairly evenly
to Software and Information Technology Services. 13 The fall-off in Clean
Tech was predicted by Randy Churchill, Director of Southern California
Emerging Company Services at PricewaterhouseCoopers.14 Mr. Churchill's
analysis is that Clean Tech will remain a strong industry area for
investment, but as the sector matures and government funding becomes
available for more capital intensive projects, the dollars invested would fall
as money moves to smaller investments. 5 That analysis is supported by
rising deal flow in the sector in the first half of 2011, even as the dollars
invested fell. For that six month period there were 154 Clean Tech deals,
with 81 occurring in Q2, which was the highest quarterly number ever
recorded for Clean Tech in the PricewaterhouseCoopers/National Venture
Capital Association MoneyTree Report.
6
Figure 4
13 id.
14 Interview with Randy Churchill, Director, Southern California Emerging
Company Services at PricewaterhouseCoopers (Feb. 15, 2011).
15 id.
"
6 MoneyTree Report: Q2 2011, supra note 10, at 3.
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Fig. 4, VC-backed IPO and M&A -Activity, provides perhaps the
strongest evidence of recovery for the venture capital market. Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs) from venture capital financed companies dropped from
eighty-six in 2007 to six in 2008 and twelve in 2009, before recovering to
seventy-two in 2010. The first quarter of 2011 saw fourteen venture-backed
companies going public, the strongest first quarter number since Q1 2007.7
The second quarter IPO numbers continued strong with twenty-two deals
reported.' 8 The law firm Fenwick & West LLP notes that forty-five
venture-backed companies were in registration at the end of the first
quarter,19 so 2011 may be one of the strongest IPO years since the tech
bubble burst. On the merger and acquisition (M&A) side, the number of
deals dropped from 380 in 2007 to 348 in 2008 and 273 in 2009, before
recovering to 420 in 2010. For 2011 we see 123 deals in the first quarter
and 79 in the second,20 which also is on track to be a strong year relative to
the past five.
These exit events are critical to venture capital investing, not only
because they represent the pay-off on existing investments, but also because
they represent the end of the investment cycle. Over the past several years,
as exits were difficult to achieve, venture capital funds had to continue to
invest cash to support companies that otherwise would be getting needed
funding from new owners, or from the public stock market. With more
money going (on an unplanned basis) to existing portfolio companies, there
was less money available to make new investments. Thus, when pay-offs
are slowed, fewer new companies get funded. The continued return of the
IPO and M&A markets will clear the remaining backlog and allow venture
capitalists to turn to new investment opportunities.
17 See id. See also Trends in Terms of Venture Financings in Silicon Valley (First
Quarter 2011,), FENWICK AND WEST LLP, 2, available at http://www.fenwick.com/
docstore/VCSurvey/Q1 11 VC Terms Survey Report.pdf.18 id
'
9 1d
"
20 MoneyTree Report: Q4 2010/Full-year 2010, supra note 10, at 14; MoneyTree
Report: Q2 2011, supra note 10.
OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
Figure 5
Vol. 7.1
Annual Investment in VC Funds
$ Billions
$35
30.8 ChartA
$30 "
26.4
$25
$20
16.3
$15 - 12.3
10.2$10 - I
W 0 0 0 0 0
0o
Fig. 5, Annual Investment in VC Funds, shows a steady decline in
limited partner investment commitments to venture capital funds from over
$31 billion in each of 2006 and 2007 to $26.4 billion in 2008, $16.3 billion
in 2009 and $12.3 billion in 2010.21 This trend is particularly troubling
when compared to the amounts venture capital funds were investing in
companies over the same time periods, shown on Fig. 1, above. One
commentator summed up the general view by noting, with strong
understatement, "[s]ince the first quarter of 2009, venture capitalists have
invested significantly more in companies ... than new capital that has been
committed to venture funds... which is not sustainable over a prolonged
period.' 22 The first half of 2011, however, showed fundraising up
substantially to $10.2 billion,23 which still is less than the $13.8 billion
21 MoneyTree Report: Q4 2010/Full-year 2010, supra note 10.
22 Trends in Terms of Venture Financings in Silicon Valley (Third Quarter 2010),
FENWICK AND WEST LLP, 2, available at http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/
VCSurvey/Q3 10_VCTermsSurveyReport.pdf.23 MoneyTree Report. Q2 2011, supra note 10.
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invested over that six-month period, but is a marked improvement from the
$21.8 billion to $12.3 billion disparity in 2010. One potential distortion of
the fundraising data is the recent formation of self-funded entities by the
"uber-rich" who have cashed out of their venture-backed companies and
seem, in growing numbers, to be creating investment organizations.24
Despite the increased flow of money into venture capital, the troubling
aspect of the fundraising numbers comes from the concentration of the
money, with over half going to four firms: Bessemer Venture Partners,
Sequoia Capital, JP Morgan and AccelPartners.25 While there always will
be some level of investment concentration, the number of funds garnering
new investment commitments in the first half of 2011 was the lowest since
the first half of 1995 .26 One conclusion that can be drawn from the venture
capital fundraising numbers is that an industry contraction could be
underway. A good number of venture capitalists would applaud a
contraction as it normally would suggest higher returns for the surviving
funds (as less money chasing deals means better pricing for venture
investors). However, not all funds serve all industries, regions or
investment stages. As a result, if there is shrinkage, there is likely to be
some disproportionate impact until the market adjusts to the opportunities
created by the new shortages. For example, it is possible that the beginnings
of this contraction have contributed to the downward shift in investment
activity in Southern California and the Midwest regions, discussed above in
connection with Fig. 2.
In summary, we are seeing a recovery in venture capital from the
immediate impact of the Great Recession. The positive trends in IPO and
M&A activity suggest that the recovery is likely to continue. The
concentration of new fundraising to only a few venture capital firms could
be an indication of a meaningful contraction in the venture capital industry
that is likely to have its greatest impact in the regions, industries and stages.
of investment not served by the very large funds now attracting investment
commitments. Although industry contraction is suggested by the data, the
investment concentration simply could be an indication that, in that portion
of the industry's recovery, the first movement is to large, high quality
funds, with money flowing to smaller, lower profile funds later.
24 E.g., OMIDYAR NETWORK, http://www.omidyar.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2010)
(an investment organization established by the founder of eBay, Inc).
25 Trends in Terms of Venture Financings in Silicon Valley (First Quarter 2011),
supra note 17; Press Release, Thomson Reuters and the National Venture Capital
Association, Venture Capital Industry Raises $2.7 Billion in Q2 2011 (July 11,
2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/11/idUS 113680+11-
Jul-201 I+HUG20110711.
26 MoneyTree Report: Q2 2011, supra note 10.
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Generally speaking, with low interest rates, the gradual re-emergence of
acquisition debt to support the M&A market, and a returning (and
potentially robust) IPO market, the outlook for venture capital investment
activity is good. The venture capital industry, as a job creation driver, is
moving in the right direction.
IV. IMPACT ON TRANSACTION TERMS
From the perspective of the entrepreneur who may be seeking venture
capital financing for his company, and the lawyers who represent those
companies, the next question is whether all this venture capital industry
upheaval has resulted in the venture funds presenting tougher investment
terms to potential portfolio companies.
This is a difficult question to address for a number of reasons. First,
different funds take different investment approaches. Even in the best of
times, some venture capitalists invest only under terms that are significantly
favorable to them as investors. Likewise, in the worst of times, some
investors offer the same "vanilla" terms they always use, assuming that
picking the right companies is more important that an aggressive set of
legal rights. Thus, regardless of the state of the venture capital industry, an
entrepreneur at any time may be presented with terms she perceives as
being harsh or as even-handed.
In addition, deal terms vary markedly between the East Coast and West
Coast. Venture capital investment almost always involves significant
participation in and oversight of each of the portfolio companies by the
venture capital professionals. As a result, simple logistics makes venture
capital investment an inherently local, or at most regional, activity. Just as
Australia's isolation allowed for the development of marsupials, the
isolation of venture capital markets has resulted in very different norms and
expectations in different parts of the country. On the East Coast, venture
capital investment is more like private equity and often carries investor-
favorable terms that make venture capital preferred stock look very debt-
like. Redemption rights and cumulative dividends, which will be discussed
below, are common on the East Coast.27 On the West Coast, as we will see,
those terms are rare.28
Also, the data presented often has limitations. For example, the law
firm Cooley LLP prepares a quarterly "Venture Financing Report., 29 While
27 See Stacey E. Curry Bishop, NVCA Model Investment Form Documents, 1853
PLI/CoRP 43 (2010).
28 1 have not identified any meaningful data on how the Midwest fits into this split,
although anecdotal information suggests that it may be more similar to the East
Coast than the West.
29 Venture Financing Report, 2010 Year in Review, COOLEY LLP (Aug. 19, 2011),
http://www.cooley.com/files/82004_VF201OQ4.pdf
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the publication provides a range of very useful information, the data is
collected from transactions in which Cooley participated as legal counsel.30
While this improves the likelihood that the data has been collected
accurately, the data also is skewed by the practice standards at Cooley and
the specific markets and relationships that make up that premier firm's
business.3' Other publications seek to report on terms offered nationally.
Unfortunately the disparity in terms between the East Coast and the West
Coast makes this like looking at the average between a horse and a cow.
The result tells you little about anything that actually exists.
The following discussion utilizes data primarily from the quarterly
publication "Trends in Terms of Venture Financings in Silicon Valley"
from Fenwick & West LLP.32 This law firm collects data on a large number
of transactions and has been publishing its survey with information going
back to 2002-Q3. The limitation is that the data comes from Silicon Valley
venture capitalists and companies. While this data is indicative of the West
Coast as a whole, it does not give us any insight on East Coast practices and
trends. With that caveat, the following discussion focuses on trends in key
venture capital transaction terms, as well as the implications of those
trends.33
301d
31 See id
32 Trends in Terms of Venture Financings in Silicon Valley, FENWICK & WEST LLP,
http://www.fenwick.com/publications/6.12.0.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2011). Each
report provides a rolling presentation of eight annual quarters, so assembling
information going back to 2002-Q3 requires the use of a number of the reports. As
they overlap in coverage (and, unlike the PricewaterhouseCoopers/National
Venture Capital Association MoneyTree Reports, are not continuously revised) the
specific reports used are not cited. At the time of this writing, 201 l-QI was the
most recent available report. Other sources are noted when their information is
used.
33 Id.
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Figure 6, Price Change from Prior Rounds, examines whether the per-
share price of the stock issued by a company in a venture capital investment
round represents a higher, even or lower price when compared to the price
used in that company's immediately prior investment round. Figure 6
shows a trend of upward pricing changes from financing round to round in
a majority of transactions that continued through 2008-Q4, but with the
percentage of deals showing upward changes beginning to decline
dramatically in 2008-Q2. As the impact of the Great Recession built, the
direction of change shifted to more deals being down (lower priced) in
2009-Ql and Q2. Pricing turned upward in 2009-Q2 and by 2009-Q3 a
majority of investments again were in up rounds. This continues to be the
case through 2011-Q1, the most recent data available. It is important to
contrast the left side of this chart from the right. Coming out of the tech
bubble, a majority of deals were down rounds through the end of 2003,
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while the Great Recession resulted in only two quarters where down rounds
outnumbered upward price movement.34
Round-to-round upward price change shows that the companies
receiving venture capital investment are putting that money to good use and
that investors continue to see their prospects as positive. When companies
return to the investment trough for more money, investors perceive them as
having taken, for example, a $2 million investment and created more than
$2 million in increased enterprise value. Preferred stock is usually issued in
series (Series A, Series B, and so on) so that each investment transaction
can reflect the specific rights applicable to that round. Frequently (at least
in the absence of untoward events) there are no significant differences
between the rights of each series of preferred stock-the only differences
are that each has its own per share investment price. The irony for legal
professionals, of course, is that this most important deal term usually is set
before the lawyers ever get involved.35
Figure 7
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Figure 7, . Liquidation Preferences, examines three different
mechanisms that may be used in setting the liquidation preference rights
granted by a company to its venture capital investors. Venture capital
preferred stock almost always is granted a "liquidation preference," that is,
the right to receive proceeds from a merger, sale or liquidation of the
company before any amounts may be paid to the holders of the common
stock (which is typically held by founders and employees). Since the fact
that the preferred stock gets paid before the common stock is virtually
always a given, the first factor we will look at on Fig. 7, senior priority,
addresses whether the newly issued series of preferred stock has a priority
versus the preferred stock already issued in earlier financing rounds.
Demanding a senior priority is an indication that investor unease is
triggering a desire for the right to be first through the exit door. What we
see is that the historical axiom of "last money in is first money out" is
becoming less and less the case. The general downward trend of the post-
bubble era in senior priority deals flattened as a result of the Great
Recession in 2008 and 2009, but in 2010 again began edging downward.
Senior priority currently is granted in less than half of West Coast deals.36
The second factor addressed in Fig. 7 is the percentage of deals having
a multiplier. applied to the investors' liquidation priority preference. The
basic liquidation priority preference amount equals the amount invested in
the preferred stock (accrued but unpaid dividends, if applicable, typically
are added). So, if the shares of a series of preferred stock cost $1.23 per
share to purchase, then their normal liquidation priority preference amount
is $1.23 per share. Only after the preferred stockholder gets its $1.23 per
share does anyone with a lower preference priority get any proceeds.37
A multiplier says that for a particular series of preferred stock the
priority preference amount is not $1.23 but some multiple of that purchase
price-perhaps 1.5 or 2 times-to be paid before the next level of priority
gets anything. Thus, a multiplier builds a profit into the priority preference
that is to be paid before the next lower priority holder gets anything at all. A
multiplier is a strong indication of investor perception of higher-than-usual
risk. As with senior priority, Fig. 7 shows a general downward trend in
multipliers in the post-bubble era. That trend stopped in 2008 in reaction to
the uncertainty of the Great Recession but, after peaking in 2009-Q1, again
began to slide. Currently less than fifteen percent of West Coast deals use
liquidation priority preference multipliers.38
The third liquidation preference factor presented in Fig. 7 is a separate
concept called participation rights. A participation right applies after all the
liquidation priority rights have been satisfied (assuming there is enough
36 Id.
37 Id.3 8 Id.
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merger, sale or liquidation proceeds to pay the full priority rights) and
refers to the right of a series of the preferred stock to participate in the
sharing out of the remaining proceeds. Absent a specific corporate charter
term -to the contrary, the residual ownership interest in a corporation
typically is held by the common stock. If no preferred stock participation
rights are granted then, after all the priority rights have been satisfied, all
the remaining proceeds available are paid out to the common stockholders.
A preferred stock liquidation participation right means that after a series of
preferred stock has received its priority amount, and all other lower priority
amounts have been satisfied, the holders of that series of preferred stock get
to participate in the residual distribution to the common stockholders as
though they held common stock instead of their preferred stock. Their
proportionate allocation is based on the number of shares of common stock
their preferred stock would convert into if it were converted. Thus, the
participating preferred stockholders are sharing when the holders of the
common stock are receiving their first dollar of proceeds. The holders of.
the participating preferred stock, having gotten back their entire investment
amount (and perhaps more if they have a dividend right or a multiplier tied
to their priority right), are receiving a gain while the common stockholders
are getting their first dollars out.3 9
In the absence of a participation right, a series of preferred stock gets its
priority amount paid out and is finished. If the company is sold for a high
price, the preferred stockholders have to decide whether they are financially
better off by taking their priority amount and no more, or whether they
should convert their preferred stock to common stock, forego their priority
right and go through the liquidation process as a common stockholder.
Having a participation right makes that problem disappear by allowing the
preferred stockholder to keep the priority right and share in the distribution
to the common stockholders.4°
Even before the tech bubble, my personal experience was that
participation rights were very common. Figure 7 shows that in 2002 they
were provided in approximately three-fourths of deals in the aftermath of
the tech bubble, but that the frequency of these rights has been in steady
decline since then. The decline leveled in the second half of 2007 through
2008-Q3, but participation rights now are included in less than half of West
Coast deals.4 '
The general message of Fig. 7 is that liquidation rights in West Coast
deals have gotten steadily less pro-investor over the last nine years. Of
course, the available data begins at a point when investors were defensive
3 9 id.
40 id.
41 The percentages of deals on Fig. 7 do not add up to 100 because all, some or
none of these factors may appear in the terms of any one series of preferred stock.
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coming off the collapse of the tech bubble, but the basic trend was not
seriously disrupted by the Great Recession. While my impression is that
liquidation terms have reached an equilibrium point, it is possible that they
will continue to ease.42
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Figure 8, Cumulative Dividends, presents the point noted earlier that on
the West Coast these rights are rarely used. A cumulative dividend in a
venture capital transaction is a dividend right that is, in effect, automatically
"declared" on a periodic basis, usually annually, but maybe quarterly. By
declaring a dividend a company obligates itself to pay that dividend. Under
typical venture capital terms, a dividend that has been declared on the
preferred stock, but not yet paid, usually must be paid as part of a
liquidation priority preference payment, a redemption payment, or upon
conversion of the preferred stock to common stock. The alternatives to a
cumulative dividend right are no dividend right (except perhaps the right to
participate with the common stock on any dividend payable to it) or a
dividend priority preference payable "when, as and if declared."
42Trends in Terms of Venture Financing in Silicon Valley, supra note 32.
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Since venture capital financed companies presumably create a very
high return on cash available to them, they rarely pay dividends in the
ordinary course of business. Thus, any dividend rights typically are not paid
until some exit event in which liquidation, redemption or conversion rights
come into play. A cumulative dividend acts like an interest factor, often like
compounded interest, on the venture capital preferred stock investment.
Over time it can create a significant shift in value to the preferred
stockholders.
Figure 8 shows that less than ten percent of West Coast deals,
regardless of the economy, include cumulative dividend rights. The Cooley
LLP Venture Financing Report showed that cumulative dividends appeared
in thirteen percent of the deals they did in 2009-QI . Cooley also reports
that outside of Silicon Valley (i.e., the East Coast) that it sees cumulative
dividends in thirty percent to forty percent of its deals.44 Other surveys
indicate cumulative dividends in up to fifty percent.45 As noted, East Coast
venture capital preferred stock tends to have more debt-like terms that what
is normally seen on the West Coast.
Figure 9
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43 Venture Financing Report, 2010 Year in Review, supra note 29.
4Id.
45 See Curry Bishop, supra note 27.
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Figure 9, Anti-dilution Adjustments, shows the types of price protection
required by venture capital investors. Setting the price of a preferred stock
for purchase by venture capital investors is as much art as it is science. One
reason is that the value of the stock is largely dependent upon future events:
whether the company uses the investment to achieve its business plan
objectives on time and on budget. Because of the risk that future events
may demonstrate that the investors over-valued the stock, they typically
require a remedy through price anti-dilution protection.
Dilution is the result of the corporation issuing more shares. To offer a
very simple example, if a company has ten shares of common stock
outstanding and you own five, you own fifty percent of the company's
stock. If the company issues ten more common stock shares, your shares are
now five out of twenty outstanding shares, so they now represent only
twenty-five percent of the company. You have been diluted. Because all
share issuances are dilutive, the question is whether the dilution was
harmful to you.
For example, if you paid $1.00 per share for your five shares, and the
new share issuance was at $20.00 per share, you were not harmed. Because
like shares are fungible and the new investor paid $20.00 per share to get
stock exactly like your shares, the new share issuance set the value of your
shares at $20.00 per share, up from $1.00. You have a smaller portion of the
company, but the portion you have is worth more, so you are ahead. You
are entitled to no anti-dilution protection because the dilution was not
harmful to you.
46
If, on the other hand, the new shares were issued at $0.50 per share,
then your $5.00 total investment now appears to be worth $2.50. This
dilution is harmful to you because it demonstrates a loss in the economic
value of your investment. That loss is made apparent by the fact that the
new share issuance was at a per-share price that was lower than the price
you paid for your shares.
Venture capital preferred stock price anti-dilution protection is
triggered by a subsequent issuance of shares at a price lower than the per-
share price that was paid by an existing holder when it purchased its
preferred stock. The price protection anti-dilution mechanism is to adjust
the rate at which the preferred stock converts to common stock. Upon a new
share issuance at a lower issuance price, the existing preferred stock is
amended so that it will convert into more shares of common stock. This is,
in effect, a retroactive price change applied to the existing preferred stock.
46 We are examining strictly the pricing issue and ignoring any qualitative harm
created by having an additional owner, moving to a clear minority position, and so
on.
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For example, an investor owns four million shares of preferred stock
that is convertible into common stock on a one-for-one basis. As a result of
a later issuance of shares at a lower per share price, the investor's preferred
stock receives an anti-dilution adjustment that provides for each share of
the preferred stock now to convert into 1.5'shares of common stock. The
investor still holds four million shares of preferred stock, but now that
preferred stock is convertible into six million shares of common stock. This
adjustment is meaningful even if the preferred stock is never actually
converted.
Venture capital preferred stock has rights based on the number of
preferred shares outstanding and the price per share paid for that stock.
Liquidation and dividend priority rights, as was touched on in the earlier
discussion, as well as redemption rights (to be addressed below) all are
based on the number of preferred stock shares outstanding and the price per
share paid for them. In addition, venture capital preferred stock also has
participation rights, which grant the right to participate in rights and
benefits of the common stock, as though the preferred stock had been
converted into common stock. Participation rights include sharing in
common stock liquidation and dividend distributions, for example.
Obviously, if the preferred stock becomes convertible into more shares of
common stock, it participates at a higher level. The ultimate participation
right probably is the right to vote with the common stock. As a result of the
anti-dilution adjustment described in the preceding paragraph, that
preferred stockholder went from having four million voting shares to six
million.
There are two basic approaches to price anti-dilution protection and the
alternative demanded by venture capital investors to a great extent is an
indication of their concern that the price they are paying will be justified by
the company's ability to use the money to increase the value of the
enterprise. A ratchet adjustment (which refers to a "full" ratchet, as
''partial" ratchets are exceedingly rare) provides the largest conversion rate
adjustment right typically granted to a preferred stock investor.
Figure 9 shows that, on the West Coast, ratchet price anti-dilution
protection is rarely granted. In the aftermath of the tech-bubble, ratchets
were never used in more than twenty percent of deals and, over the last five
years, the rate of usage consistently has stayed at ten percent of deals or
less. Cooley reports similar results.
47
Looking at other information sources, one surveyor compared small
samples on each coast for the one year period ended June 30, 2008 and saw
ratchets in 10.7% of deals in its Bay Area sample and in 22.9% of its New
47 See Venture Financing Report, 2010 Year in Review, supra note 29.
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York and New England sample.4s While these numbers may not exactly
reflect reality, they do support the basic premise that West Coast deals have
more company-friendly terms.
The primary alternative to a ratchet is a weighted average formula,
which almost always means a broad-based formula (narrow-based
formulas exist but are rarely used). A weighted average formula generates a
preferred stock conversion rate adjustment that takes into account the
amount by which the per share price went down in the new, lower-priced
transaction, with a larger price drop resulting in a larger adjustment for
existing holders. It also takes into account the relative number of shares
being issued in the new investment in relation to the total existing number
of shares, with a larger transaction (which has a greater impact on existing
holders) resulting in a larger adjustment. The terms "broad-based" and
"narrow-based" refer to how many of the existing ownership interests are
included in the formula (only outstanding shares or also include shares
issuable upon the exercise of stock options and warrants, for example). A
broad-based formula includes more shares in the number deemed to be
outstanding immediately prior to the new issuance, and thus results in
smaller adjustments than a narrow-based formula.
Despite the fact that a broad-based weighted average formula
adjustment is the least favorable to venture-capital investors, it is far and
away the most common price anti-dilution adjustment used. Figure 9 shows
that even coming out the tech bubble, weighted average formulas were used
in approximately eighty percent of West Coast deals. Since 2006 they have
appeared in over ninety percent of deals. The result of the Great Recession
was a one-quarter dip to only ninety-three percent. Cooley's reports.
consistently show weighted average formulas in over eighty percent of
deals from 2006 through 2010.
49
The final set of data tracked in Fig. 9 is the nominal percentage of deals
where no price anti-dilution protection was provided. It is important to note
that the deal term being addressed is only the price protection aspect of
anti-dilution rights. Virtually every convertible security includes a separate
right to anti-dilution protection unrelated to relative transaction pricing.
This protection is triggered in the event of a structural change in the
security into which the convertible security converts. For example, venture
capital preferred stock typically converts into common stock. If the
common stock of a company represents one million shares and the
48 Venture Capital Deal Terms Report, Dow JONEs 25 (2009) (citing fifty-six
respondents in the Bay Area and thirty-five in New York and New England. In
contrast, Fenwick & West states in its report for 2011 Q1 that its statistics are based
on 122 transactions).
49 See Venture Financing Report, 2010 Year in Review, supra note 29.
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preferred stock, converting one-for-one, also represents one million shares,
what should happen if the common stock is split such that each common
stock share now represents four shares? With no adjustment, the preferred
stock, which previously would have participation rights with the common
stock on a 50/50 basis, still would be convertible into one million shares
with the common stock now consisting of four million shares. The
participation level is now at a 20/80 basis. The preferred stock protection
against this result is a proportionate conversion rate adjustment. If the
number of common stock shares has been increased by a factor of four, then
the preferred stock conversion rate is also increased by a factor of four. As
a result of the adjustment, in our example, there are four million shares of
common stock and the adjusted conversion rate causes the one million
shares of preferred stock to now be convertible into four million common
stock shares, so a 50/50 participation ratio is reestablished. This right to a
proportionate anti-dilution adjustment is not addressed in Fig. 9 because it
should appear, and absent serious error does, in every venture capital
preferred stock.
The final term examined is redemption. In the venture capital context,
redemption is the right of the investors to require the company to
repurchase the preferred stock, typically at the original issuance price, plus
a premium that equates to interest over the outstanding term of the
investment. Redemption rights usually become available five years after the
shares are issued.
For a venture capital investor, getting your investment amount back,
plus a relatively low interest rate, is not a good result. Venture capital
investors are looking to do far better than the six to twelve percent interest
factor included in a redemption price. The fact is that redemption rights are
very rarely actually exercised. In short, if the company is doing well,
investors do not want to be redeemed. If the company is doing poorly, it
typically does not have the resources to complete a redemption without
committing a fraud on its creditors.5° So why even grant redemption rights?
Redemption rights exist to give the investors leverage to force the
company to work toward an exit transaction. The threat of using a
redemption right, which would create a horrible financial strain on the
company, focuses founders and management on the fact that venture capital
investors want out of their investment quickly, and after five years they are
getting impatient.
50 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a) (2011); CAL. CORP. CODE § 500 (West
2011) et seq.
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Figure 10
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Figure 10, Redemption Rights, shows that on the West Coast,
redemption rights currently appear in only about twenty percent of deals."
Coming out of the tech bubble the rate touched forty percent, but the
decided trend has been downward into the low twenties, with a small blip
up in early 2008.52 Redemption is another area where regional differences
are significant--the right is not regularly granted on the West Coast, while
on the East Coast it appears in half or more of the venture capital
transactions.53
51 Trends in Terms of Venture Financings in Silicon Valley, supra note 32.
52 Id.
53 Venture Capital Deal Terms Report, supra note 48, at 26.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
While the Great Recession has had a significant adverse effect on the
venture capital industry, its impact on venture capital investment terms was
short lived.
In contrast to the tech bubble, in which the venture-capital industry
played a major role, the Great Recession was triggered in other parts of the
financial sector. Venture capital was hurt because it is dependent upon the
financial markets for investment commitments (Fig. 5) and for the iPOs and
M&A deals (Fig. 5) that provide its exit transactions. Yet, despite that pain,
the industry appears to have moved onto a recovery path in 2011. While
there is a prospect of some long-term contraction in investment in venture
capital, commitments to venture-capital funds are growing and a continued
significant improvement in exit opportunities for venture-backed companies
may cause those commitments to grow further, staving off any meaningful
industry contraction.
The most dramatic deal term movement we saw from the Great
Recession was round-to-round pricing (Fig. 6), which seriously dipped in
2008. However, the valley was a sharp one, with a strong upward pricing
trend beginning in 2009. Aside from pricing, we see the Great Recession
causing only small movements in liquidation preferences (Fig. 7),
cumulative dividends (Fig. 8), anti-dilution protection (Fig. 9) and
redemption rights (Fig. 10). In fact, deal terms returned to normal trends
more quickly than the overall health of the venture capital industry might
have suggested.
In short, in the context of the venture capital markets, the primary
impact on entrepreneurs from the Great Recession was the fall-off in the
amount of venture capital investment available and lower pricing imposed
on companies in their capital-raising stock issuances. Those trends began
reversing in 2010 and apparently will be completely reset in 2011.
If those results continue and we see annual venture capital investments
return to the $25 to $30 billion range in 2011, then the deal term impact of
the Great Recession will have been completely extinguished. More
importantly, venture capital then will return to its historic job creation
levels and will play an important part in the economic recovery.
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